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Abstract This paper critically reviews the judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit In re: Jayson Reynoso: Frankfort Digital Services
et al., v. Sara L. Kistler, United States Trustee et al. (2007) 447 F.3d 1117. The
appellants, who were non-lawyers, were indicted with unauthorised practice of law
for offering bankruptcy petition services via online legal software or expert systems
in law configured for filing bankruptcy petition forms. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found inter alia that appellants were bankruptcy
petition preparers, and not being lawyers, had exceeded their clerical remit by
offering legal advice and legal services in contravention of California law regulating
legal practice and 11 U.S.C. Sect. 110 of the Bankruptcy Code (2002). While
examining the legal ramifications of the use of legal software by non-lawyers in the
preparation of legal documents, the paper critically reviews the factual circum-
stances of the Reynoso decision in the context of juridical and statutory constructs
of unauthorised practice of law in the United States. The paper poses the question
whether Reynoso should be viewed as a one-off decision bound by its peculiar facts,
or good law for the broad proposition that non-lawyers cannot use legal software in
legal documents preparation. The paper also notes the possible legal barriers to an
unconditional ban on the design, sale, distribution, and uses of legal software by
non-lawyers. These range from the First Amendment right to free speech, consti-
tutional right to pro se legal representation, interstate commerce doctrine, to anti-
trust provisions of the Sherman Act. A regime of best practices for the use of legal
software or expert systems in law by non-lawyers is proffered.
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1 Introduction
In Great Britain, the Law Society’s exclusive monopoly on conveyancing services was
loosened in 1987 (Leef 1997).1 This contrasts sharply with the United States, where the
legal profession jealously guards its turf by fencing-off non-lawyers from convey-
ancing, legal documents preparation, or any activities that are perceived as the
traditional preserves of lawyers or statutorily defined as the practice of law (Lanctot
2002). Ostensibly, the main policy rationale for this prohibition is legal services
quality assurance and the protection of the public from unqualified legal practitioners,
who while appropriating the full benefits of legal practice, often eschew the
corresponding responsibilities that traditionally underpin the attorney and client
relationship (Fischer 2000–2001).2 For example, the British firm, Desktop Lawyer,
which sells customised online and offline legal documents for personal and business
uses via its ‘‘Rapidocs’’ software, operates a disclaimer policy that expressly absolves
the firm from any liability associated with the use of its ‘‘intelligent’’ legal documents.3
Ditto LegalZoom, a similar online firm based in the United States, which sells legal
information and documents. It describes itself as a provider of legal document
services, and would not be drawn into ‘‘an attorney-client relationship’’ with its
customers.4 The aforesaid firms’ reluctance to assume responsibility for any liability
arising from their quasi-legal services or enter into any confidential relationships akin
to that of attorney and client relationship, is arguably informed by the ground rules
prohibiting lay persons from representing themselves as lawyers (Messina 2000).
Even then, the brazenness of non-lawyers cashing in on legal or quasi-legal services,
while disclaiming responsibility for liabilities arising from their activities, has fueled
resentments from opponents such as Gibeaut (1998)5. For example, while decrying the
incursions of accountants on lawyers’ turf, Gibeaut argued that accountants could not
‘‘offer broad-ranging confidentiality or loyalty and the protections that those duties try
to guarantee’’, and warned that if legislators would not stop accountants’ dabbling in
legal practice, the legal profession would become indistinguishable from accounting
overtime.6 Gibeaut’s views are but symptomatic of the fierce vocational turf fencing
(often rightly fortified by prescriptive educational training and compulsory profes-
sional membership) that generally characterise the professions such as medicine,
1 In Britain, the deregulation of conveyancing services in 1987 by the Thatcher government opened legal
services market to licensed conveyancers who were not members of the legal profession, with dramatic
decrease in conveyancing fees. See Leef (1997) (Winter 1997), at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/
regv20n1/reg20n1c.html (last accessed on 2 August 2010). However, while laypersons are not expressly
prohibited from giving legal advice, they cannot misrepresent themselves as legal specialists. See
Messina (2000), at 327.
2 Fischer (2000–2001); Ohio State Bar Association v. Newburn (2008) 119 Ohio St.3d 96, where Ohio
Supreme Court held inter alia that ‘‘Our jurisdiction thus extends to regulating unauthorized practice of
law, which we do to protect the public from agents who have not been qualified to practice law and who
are not amenable to the general discipline of the court.’’ Ibid., at 97.
3 Online and offline documents on offer vary from wills, divorce, employment contract to agency
contract. See www.desktoplawyer.co.uk (accessed on 2 August 2010).
4 See http://www.legalzoom.com/disclaimer-popup.html (accessed on 2 August 2010).
5 Gibeaut (1998), at 42 and 47.
6 Ibid.
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engineering, accounting, etc., and is by no means peculiar to the legal profession. Thus
Gibeaut’s views could be reasonably and logically extrapolated to the following
rhetorical question: if lawyers could not dabble in surveying or accountancy, why
should surveyors and accountants dabble in legal practice?
However, critics have fingered a more self-serving motive for views such as
Gibeaut’s that back enforced exclusion of non-lawyers from legal documents
preparation, or offering of legal or quasi legal services in the United States: the
fostering of an exclusive cartel with an unbridled stranglehold on legal practice
(Fischer 2000–2001).7 This perceived monopoly on conveyancing or legal
documents preparation by members of the Bar in the United States, has been
directly implicated in the characteristically expensive legal services, and has given
rise to the perception of constraints on consumers’ choice (Leef 1997).8
Perhaps then, US lawyers’ monopoly on conveyancing and legal documents
preparation is an anachronism or a two-edged sword that could at once protect and
harm the consumer? There is certainly a balance to be struck, and the British
government certainly thought it expedient to loosen the Law Society’s monopoly on
conveyancing practice in 1987, by opening up the market to licensed conveyancers
who were not necessarily members of the legal profession.9 The policy deregulating
conveyancing services in Britain however precludes non-lawyers from representing
themselves as lawyers or legal experts (Messina 2000).10
Even in the United States where the market in legal services is exclusive to members
of the Bar, lawyers’ monopoly on legal practice as such, is at best tenuous, and has
hardly ever been absolute or exclusive. Historically, professionals such as accoun-
tants, real estate managers and other professions with ancillary interests in the
preparation of tax documents, bankruptcy documents, leases, conveyances, and other
legal and quasi-legal documents have fought back at the perceived legal practitioners’
monopoly with a relative degree of success (Rentz 2005; Justice 1991).11
Significantly, others on the outer periphery such as paralegals and bankruptcy
petition preparers are restricted to the clerical work of typing legal documents rather
than preparing them or advising on their contents.12 However, information
7 Fischer (2000–2001), supra, note 3, at 138–139.
8 Leef (1997), supra, note 1.
9 Ibid.
10 Messina (2000), supra, note 1, 367, at 372. As noted above, this probably explains why the British
firm, Desktop Lawyer, would not assume responsibilities inherent in lawyer-client relationships. See notes
4 and 5, supra.
11 Justice (1991, 179), Rentz (2005, Fall), Schwab (2000), Palomar (1991). However, for most, the
unauthorised practice of law huddle remains an implacable barrier. This is exemplified by the 2008 Ohio
Supreme Court decision, which found a professional surveyor whose work involved incidental
preparation of conveyances, liable for unauthorised practice of law. The Court had held that the
‘‘… practice of law embraces the preparation of legal documents on another’s behalf, including deeds
which convey real property.’’ See Ohio State Bar Association v. Newburn, supra, note 3, at 97.
12 For example, in New York County Lawyers’ Association v. Dacey, 283 N.Y.S. 2d 984, at 990, (App. Div.),
Revised 234 N.E.2d 459 (N.Y. 1967). It was held inter alia that ‘‘[t]he copying or completion of a form may
consist merely of clerical work but the selecting of the proper form and telling a clerk what to copy and how to
fill in the blanks is lawyers’ work.’’ Also in Ohio State Bar Association v. Newburn, supra, note 3, at 97, the
Ohio Supreme Court noted that the practice of law embraced the preparation of legal document.
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technological tools such as legal software and the internet have blurred the fuzzy
boundaries between clerical chores of typing of legal documents and legal
documents preparation or offering of legal advice, thus rendering bankruptcy
petition preparers and paralegals vulnerable to the perils of unauthorised practice of
law charges. However, before reviewing the US Court of Appeals decision in the
Reynoso case, it is apt to briefly discuss the phenomenon of legal software or expert
systems in law and its revolutionary impacts on legal information dissemination and
access.
2 Legal software or expert systems in law defined
In general terms, expert systems are an amalgam of artificial intelligence and specific
body of knowledge configured to execute tasks, solve problems, and proffer advice that
is otherwise the prerogative of human intelligence (Susskind 2000).13 In the realm of
legal information science, expert systems in law or legal software are specifically
programmed for legal information retrieval, legal reasoning and problems solving,
drawing on critical legal database resource or knowledge.14 Although the use of expert
systems in law for judicial decision support, legal information management and
retrieval by judges, legal academics and lawyers is sacrosanct,15 its use for legal
reasoning and advice has not yet been satisfactorily programmed, and have had
relatively limited successes (Oskamp and Lauritsen 2002).16 Nevertheless, expert
systems in law or legal software programs offering commercial online and offline
computer-mediated legal services are now ubiquitous (Lanctot 2002),17 with concom-
itant legal externalities, ranging from malpractice risks for lawyers,18 breaching of
multi-jurisdictional practice restriction rules (Glass and Jackson 2000–2001),19
13 The ubiquitous cash dispenser machines are an example of expert systems. For discussion, see
Susskind (2000), at 162–176.
14 See Susskind (1987) at 3.
15 For example, legal information retrieval systems such as WESTLAW and LEXIS are crucial expert
systems for legal academia and the legal profession. For discussion, see Susskind (2000), supra, note 14
at 221–222.
16 Oskamp and Lauritsen (2002), Susskind (1987), supra, note 15 at 3.
17 For discussion, see Lanctot 2002, supra, note 2, at 811–854.
18 Susskind suggested that legal advisers could most certainly be held liable for resultant losses from
negligent advice proffered using expert systems in law. See Susskind (1996). See also Morrison (1989).
The author opined that concerns for potential malpractice liability risks were a major obstacle to
widespread adoption of rule-based expert systems by lawyers. Ibid; at 34.
19 The American Bar Association, Report of the Commission on Multi-jurisdictional Practice defines the
term as ‘‘…the legal work of a lawyer in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is not admitted to practice
law.’’ See American Bar Association Centre for Professional Responsibility, Client Representation in the
21st Century: Report of the Commission of Multi-jurisdictional Practice (August, 2002), at
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/notices/reports/abareport.pdf (assessed on 2 August 2010). The inherent
multi-jurisdictional nature of online practice of law by lawyers is a concomitant externality to the
increasing use of modern telecommunication technologies in legal practice. See for example the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court dicta in Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C., v. Superior Court of Santa
Clara County. 949 P.2d. at 4. The Birbrower court opined that a lawyer not physically present in
California could still be deemed to practice law in contravention of California law forbidding out-of-state
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to potential charges of unauthorised practice of law for non-lawyers in the United
States.20
Significantly, the parameters of the conditions for use, and the legal ramifications
of the use of expert systems in law or legal software by non-lawyers remain as yet
tangled due to the inherent ambiguity on what constitutes the practice of law in the
United States.21 The pertinent questions therefore are: How could non-lawyers who
use legal software escape possible unauthorised practice of law charges? Should the
Reynoso decision, where the Court of Appeals held that the use of a bankruptcy
petition software constituted unauthorised practice of law, be viewed as a one-off
decision bound by its peculiar facts and merits, or good law for the general
proposition that non-lawyers, using expert systems in law are generally engaged in
unauthorised practice of law? Employing the factual circumstances of the Reynoso
decision as a backgrounder, the paper will answer these questions in light of
juridical and statutory constructs of unauthorised practice of law in the United
States.
3 The decision
A. In re: Jayson Reynoso: Frankfort Digital Services et al., v. Sara L. Kistler,
United States Trustee, et al.22
Appellants Henry Ihejirika and Frankfort Digital Services, Ltd.; operated a web-
based bankruptcy software, which generated complete bankruptcy petitions
schedules, and statements of financial affairs from information entered by patron
bankruptcy petitioners in dialogue boxes on the web-based expert systems at
‘‘700law.com’’ and ‘‘Ziinet.com’’.23 Ihejirika was an entrepreneur who owned and
conducted businesses as Frankfort Digital Services via the said websites.24 The
websites sold licenses to debtors to access web-based bankruptcy documents
preparation software. Neither of the appellants (Ihejirika and Frankfort Digital
Services) was an attorney.25
On 30 January 2002, Jayson Reynoso, a debtor, paid $219 for the use of
appellants’ web-based ‘‘Ziinet Bankruptcy Engine’’ to prepare his bankruptcy
Footnote 19 continued
practice of law, if he advised a California resident client via telephone, fax, computer, or other modern
technological means. Ibid. For discussion, see Glass and Jackson 2000–2001.
20 This is exemplified by the case of In re: Jayson Reynoso, Debtor, Frankfort Digital Services, LTD.;
Henry Ihejirika, Appellants, v. Sara L. Kistler, United States Trustee, Appellee, and Executive Office of
United States Trustee, Trustee. (2007) 477 F.3d 1117.
21 Lanctot (2002), supra, note 2 at 811–822, Glass and Jackson 2000–2001, supra, note 21 at 1195.
22 Ibid, at 1117–1126.
23 The facts of the Reynoso decision as restated here are drawn from the decision of the United States
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit in re: Jayson Reynoso, Debtor. Frankfort Digital
Services, LTD.; Henry Ihejirika, Appellants, v. William T. Neary, United States Trustee, Appellee. (2004)
315 B.R. 544, at 547–554.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
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petition and schedules.26 ‘‘Ziinet’’, the website hosting the bankruptcy engine,
advised prospective customers in the United States on how to ‘‘Keep BK Off Your
Credit,’’ ‘‘Keep Everything Even 4 Or 5 Cars,’’ and ‘‘File bankruptcy and keep it out
of your credit report!’’27 The website further guaranteed that ‘‘Ziinet’’ would
automatically select bankruptcy exemptions,28 and then vouched for the compe-
tency of the ‘‘Ziinet’’ bankruptcy engine as follows:
Ziinet is an expert system and knows the law. Unlike most programs which are
little more than customized word processors the Ziinet engine is an expert
system. It knows bankruptcy laws right down to those applicable to the state in
which you live. Now you no longer need to spend weeks studying bankruptcy
laws.29
On 30 January 2002, Reynoso was advised by the appellants via email that he
could access ‘‘The Vault’’ purportedly housing ‘‘bankruptcy secrets’’ ranging from
how to keep a bankruptcy off a credit report, to how to protect ‘‘more than your fair
share of assets.’’30 During trial, Reynoso testified that he declined to use this option
because he feared being confused and thought ‘‘it wasn’t right to do things like
that.’’31 Reynoso also testified that he filed his bankruptcy petition, scheduling, and
statements on 28 February 2002 by entering his identification, assets, debts, income,
etc., into dialog boxes of the web-based Ziinet bankruptcy software.32 The
bankruptcy software then automatically generated completed bankruptcy forms with
instructions on how to print them.33
However, the completed forms generated by Ziinet bankruptcy engine were beset
with errors and misrepresentations. First, Reynoso crucially failed to list his
household goods and personal clothing items on the filed schedules. He testified that
he was led on by the software instructions to believe that he was not required to list
those assets.34 Second, neither the signature nor the social security number of the
non-attorney bankruptcy petition preparer were entered in the allocated space on
the bankruptcy form, as required by the Bankruptcy law under oath. Instead, the
bankruptcy software generated an automated answer to the effect that Reynoso
prepared the bankruptcy petition on his own and without the assistance of an
attorney, paralegal or a bankruptcy petition preparer.35 This was a significant
misrepresentation that bordered on perjury and the court of first instance and
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
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appellate courts used it as evidence of fraudulent, unfair and deceptive conduct by
the appellants.36
The Chapter 7 trustees (the appellee) brought an action against the appellants in
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California for
alleged violations of 11 U.S.C. Sect. 110 of Federal Bankruptcy Code (2002);
unauthorised practice of law under California law; and fraudulent, unfair and
deceptive conduct.37 The lawsuit sought fines and disgorgement of fees paid by
Reynoso to the appellants. It also sought a perpetual injunction barring appellants
from further acting as bankruptcy petition preparers or engaging in unauthorised
practice of law contrary to California law.38
3.1 The ruling of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District
of California
The Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California ruled inter alia that
appellants were bankruptcy petition preparers, and being non-lawyers, had engaged
in unauthorised practice of law.39 Appellants’ argument to the contrary that they
merely owned a website, which allowed access to bankruptcy software by debtors
across the United States, was rejected by the Bankruptcy Court as follows:
Websites don’t just grow out of thin air and aren’t maintained out of thin air.
They’re put together by people; they’re put on the Internet; and it’s not the
website that provides the assistance. It’s the people who develop website that
provide the assistance.40
The Bankruptcy Court further held that appellants had intentionally concealed
their actions as bankruptcy petition preparers, and engaged in fraudulent, unfair, and
deceptive conduct, and had intentionally violated 11 U.S.C. Sect. 110 of Bankruptcy
Code (2002).41 The Bankruptcy Court then assessed fines; ordered a refund of $219
fees paid by Reynoso to the appellants, and permanently enjoined the appellants
from acting as bankruptcy petition preparers, and engaging in unauthorised practice
of law.42 The appellants were dissatisfied, and appealed the ruling of the Bankruptcy
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 The Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California’s ruling restated here, is as gleaned from
the ruling of the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit in re: Reynoso, Jayson,
(Debtor) Frankfort Digital Services, Ltd.; Henry Ihejirika (Appellants) v. William T. Neary, United States
Trustee, (Appellee) supra, note 24. There is no recorded opinion of the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern
District of California in the Reynoso case. However, a related proceeding (with identical facts involving a
different debtor but same appellants Frankfort Digital Services et al.,) was heard by the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California, Los Angeles Division, and reported in re:
Christiana Pillot, 2002 Bankr. LEXIS 1334.
40 Excerpted from the Bankruptcy Court for Northern District of California’s Transcript, 44:3–8, and
cited in re: Reynoso, supra, note 24, at 552.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
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Court for the Northern District of California to the United States Bankruptcy
Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit.
3.2 The ruling of the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth
Circuit
In the Appeal before the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth
Circuit, the main issues for determination were: First, whether the Bankruptcy Court
erred in holding that appellants were bankruptcy petition preparers. Second, whether
the Bankruptcy Court erred in holding that appellants engaged in unauthorised
practice of law. Third, whether the Bankruptcy Court erred in holding that
appellants were engaged in fraudulent, unfair, or deceptive conduct and whether
the appellant should refund all fees paid for the use of the bankruptcy software.43
The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed the judgment of the Bankruptcy Court for
the Northern District of California, and held inter alia that appellants were
bankruptcy petition preparers under 11 U.S.C. Sect. 110(a)(1).44 In the Bankruptcy
Appellate Panel’s words:
The plain language of Sect. 110(a) supports the bankruptcy court’s finding that
appellants are BPP (bankruptcy petition preparers) – they (through their
websites) transformed raw information into completed bankruptcy forms for
filing in the court, and charged fees for this service. There is no significant
difference between what appellants did and the more familiar law office (or
BPP) practice of obtaining information from clients on input forms and
recasting that data into appropriate forms or pleadings for filing. That
appellants did so electronically, at a distance and by programming software,
does not change the nature of their operation; their arguments to the contrary
are unconvincing.45
The United States Appellate Panel held further that appellants were engaged in
unauthorised practice of law under California law, which defines legal practice as
‘‘…legal advice and counsel preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which
legal rights are secured although such matter may or may not be pending in a
court.’’46 The Appellate Panel expatiated on the elements of unauthorised practice
of law charges as follows:
Solicitation of information which is then translated into completed bankruptcy
forms is the unauthorized practice of law, whether by website or otherwise, as
is advising a debtor of the availability of particular exemptions…Appellants
do not dispute that their software solicits information from users, that it directs
them to the applicable sections of the California Code of Civil Procedure for
exemptions, and that it transforms the raw data into completed forms. The
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
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bankruptcy court did not err in concluding that appellants engaged in
unauthorized practice of law.47
Moreover, the appellants admitted that they neither entered their signatures nor
social security numbers as required under 11 U.S.C. Sect. 110(b) (c) for non-
attorney bankruptcy petition preparers, nor filed a declaration as to fees as required
under 11 U.S.C. Sect. 110(h). The Appellate Panel used this admission to find that
appellants had made false statements to the court and intentionally concealed their
involvement as bankruptcy petition preparers. The Panel held further that this
conduct was fraudulent, unfair, and deceptive, and went on to enjoin the appellants
from acting as bankruptcy petition preparers in violations of 11 U.S.C. Sect. 110.48
3.3 The ruling of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Dissatisfied with the judgment of the Appellate Panel, the appellants further
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.49 On the
question of whether appellants were bankruptcy petition preparers, the Court of
Appeals extensively reviewed the provisions of 11 U.S.C. Sect. 110(a) (1) of the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code which defines a bankruptcy petition preparer as ‘‘…a person,
other than an attorney or an employee of an attorney, who prepares for
compensation a document for filing.’’50 The Court of Appeals rejected appellants’
argument that ‘‘…the creation and ownership of a software program used by a
licensee to prepare his or her bankruptcy forms is not preparation of a document for
filing under the statute,’’ and held that the software at issue qualified as a bankruptcy
petition preparer.51 The Court of Appeals then affirmed the rulings of the
Bankruptcy Court and the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel that the appellants were
bankruptcy petition preparers under the statute, and held inter alia as follows:
In sum, for a fee, Frankfort provided customers with completed bankruptcy
petitions. Customers merely provided the data requested by the software and
printed the finished forms. This is materially indistinguishable from other
cases in which individuals or corporations have been deemed bankrupt
petition preparers.52
Having found that the appellants were bankruptcy petition preparers, the Court of
Appeals held further that appellants exceeded their clerical remit under 11 U.S.C.
Sect. 110(k) by practising law, since the services of bankruptcy petition preparers
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid; at 553.
49 In re: Jayson Reynoso, (Debtor), Frankfort Digital Services, Ltd.; Henry Ihejirika, (Appellants), v.
Sara L. Kistler, United States Trustee, (Appellee), and Executive Office of United States Trustee,
(Trustee). Supra, note 21 at 1119–1126.
50 Ibid; at 1123.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
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were strictly limited to clerical typing of information into bankruptcy forms.53 The
Court of Appeals further noted that while bankruptcy petition preparers could provide
services solely by typing, it was not permissible for them to provide legal advice and
legal services as the appellants had done.54 The Court noted further that whether or
not a given activity constituted an unauthorised legal practice depended on the
underlying peculiar context and circumstances.55 The court found that the bankruptcy
software in question provided more than clerical services by determining where to
place information provided by the debtor and supplying legal citations.56 The Court
noted that this was against California law regulating legal practice, and then drew on
Baron v. City of Los Angeles,57 which established that California law has long accepted
that ‘‘the practice of law… includes legal advice and counsel and the preparation of
legal documents and contracts.’’58 The Court then ruled that under the factual
circumstances of the case, appellants’ offer of legal advice and services contravened
11 U.S.C. Sect. 110(k) and California law regulating legal practice.59 Significantly, the
Court of Appeals’ findings that appellants’ conduct constituted unauthorised practice
of law were premised on a combination of factual circumstances (other than
appellants’ mere use of bankruptcy preparation software) that underpinned the modus
operandi of appellants’ business. In the Court’s words:
Several features of Frankfort’s business, taken together, lead us to conclude
that it engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. To begin, Frankfort held
itself out as offering legal expertise. Its websites offered customers extensive
advice on how to take advantage of so-called loopholes in the bankruptcy
code, promised services comparable to those of a ‘‘top-notch’’ bankruptcy
lawyer, and described its software as an ‘‘expert system’’ that would do more
than function as a ‘‘customized word processor.60
The Court of Appeals then affirmed the lower courts’ rulings to the effect that
appellants had engaged in fraudulent, unfair, or deceptive conduct, that they should
refund all fees paid for the use of their bankruptcy software, and that they should be
permanently enjoined from unauthorised legal practice or practising as bankruptcy
petition preparers.61
53 Ibid., at 1125. At the commencement of the trial section 110(k) of Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code (2002) did not specifically prohibit unauthorised legal practice. It provided that ‘‘Nothing in this
section shall be construed to permit activities that are otherwise prohibited by law, including rules and
laws that prohibit the unauthorized practice of law’’. However, an amendment to the Bankruptcy Code via
the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act 2005 (BAP-CPA), Pub. L. No. 109-8,
119 Stat. 23, specifically barred bankruptcy petition preparers from providing legal advice. See Sect.
110(e) (2) of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, ibid.
54 In re: Jayson Reynoso, supra, note 21 at 1125.
55 Ibid.
56 Emphasis is mine. Ibid.
57 469 P. 2d 353 (1970).
58 In re Jayson Reynoso, supra, note 21 at 1125.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
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4 Discussion
The pertinent question is whether Reynoso is good law for a broad proposition that
non-lawyers cannot use expert systems in law or legal software in the United States?
Arguably, the answer would invariably depend on the factual circumstances of each
case because, and significantly, neither the facts of the case nor the decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit expressly validate such a broad
proposition.62 The Court actually declined to express any views on whether the use of
legal software alone, or other types of computer programs would as such constitute the
practice of law.63 However, the Court did observe that the bankruptcy software in
Reynoso provided more than clerical services by automatically determining where to
place information provided by the debtor and supplying legal citations. This according
to the Court amounted to legal documents preparation and offering of legal advice.64
The software did, indeed, go far beyond providing clerical services. It
determined where (particularly, in which schedule) to place information
provided by the debtor, selected exemptions for the debtor and supplied
relevant legal citations. Providing such personalized guidance has been held to
constitute the practice of law.65
It would thus appear from the above that while the non-lawyer use of legal
software is not prohibited as such, non-lawyers could still be liable for unauthorised
practice of law if the legal software in question exceeded its clerical remit,66 by
preparation of legal documents or proffering of legal advice. Preparation of legal
documents by non-attorneys is generally equated with legal advice, and would
amount to unauthorised practice of law in the United States.67 Although it has been
criticised ‘‘as formalistic or unworkable’’, the distinction between clerical work of
typing of legal documents, and preparation of legal documents, is the traditional
benchmark for ascertaining whether a non-attorney is engaged in unauthorised
practice of law (Lanctot 2002).68 Therefore by extrapolation, Reynoso decision
could arguably be said to support a limited or restrictive, or clerical use of legal
software by non-lawyers.
However, the problem with such narrow legal construction of the non-lawyer use
of legal software as espoused in Reynoso, is that legal software are intelligent agents
configured to perform complex tasks,69 and they would invariably lose their
62 Ibid., at 1117–1126.
63 Ibid., at 1126.
64 Ibid., at 1125.
65 Ibid., at 1125–1126.
66 Clerical work is generally perceived as limited to typing of information provided by the consumer
without alteration, advice, or proffering of any opinion on the information. For discussion, see Lanctot
(2002), supra, note 2, at 833–836.
67 Ohio State Bar Association v. Newburn, supra, note 3, at 97. The Ohio Supreme Court noted that the
practice of law embraced the preparation of legal document. Ibid.
68 Lanctot (2002), supra, note 2, at 834.
69 Susskind (2000), supra note 14, at 162–176.
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commercial shines and technical appeals if their uses were restricted and
subjected to heavy judicial scrutiny and narrow operational confines of clerical
chores. Thus, a restricted clerical use of legal software by non-lawyers as
implicitly espoused in Reynoso would be no more as commercially useful and
attractive as a DVD recorder that could not be used for fear it would infringe
copyright. However, the analogy of legal software and a DVD recorder is
inherently limited, because whilst the user of a DVD recorder could easily buy a
license or a legal right to relevant copyright works, a non-attorney desirous of
using legal software beyond its clerical remit, would have to first enroll at a law
school and qualify as an attorney.
However, it would be interesting to know how the Court of Appeals in
Reynoso would have ruled if the use of the bankruptcy preparation software had
not been coupled with outrageous claims of legal expertise and fraudulent
misrepresentations by the appellants. In all probability, the Court could still have
found the appellants liable for unauthorised practice of law anyway, since,
according to the Court’s findings, the legal software had suo motu prepared the
bankruptcy petition by soliciting information from Reynoso. This task, according
to the Court, transcended mere clerical chores and amounted to the provision of
legal advice.70
The court’s narrow views on the acceptable use of legal software by non-
lawyers, thus inevitably raises a pertinent question: how do you configure legal
software to perform mere clerical, nonlawyer chores? Without doubt this should
be possible for programmers. The major downside however is that an enforced
restricted design and use of legal software would be commercially useless and
unattractive. Moreover, tailoring the design of legal software to avoid the
charges of unauthorised practice of law by nonlawyers could potentially stifle
the development of legal information science, which is of immense benefits to
the legal profession and the judiciary. This dilemma resonates well with other
technologies with dual-use potentials, such as copying technologies that facilitate
copyright infringements. The best strategy might be a balanced oversight that
allows for unfettered development of legal software, while monitoring unscru-
pulous non-lawyer uses.
A fortiori, it could be logically deduced from the foregoing analyses that a
restrictive or clerical non-lawyer use of bankruptcy legal software, or any legal
software for that matter, sans legal advice, would not impinge on the unauthorised
practice of law legislations in the United States. However, any outright ban on the
use of legal software by non-lawyers as such, could most certainly violate the
provisions of anti-trust law, the constitutional commerce clause doctrine, the First
Amendment right to free speech, and the right to pro se legal representation as
guaranteed by the Constitution of United States (Rhode 1981).71 These arguments
are further explored in the following paragraphs.
70 In re: Jayson Reynoso, supra, note 21 at 1125.
71 For discussion, see Rhode (1981).
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4.1 Outright ban on non-lawyer use of legal software by States’ legislations
could likely impinge on federal antitrust laws
The Sherman Antitrust Act72 generally prohibits persons from making any contract
or engaging in any combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce, or
monopolising trade among States.73 However, States are generally immune from the
provisions of the Sherman Act, through the judicially created state action exemption
doctrine (Trujillo 2006), as espoused by the US Supreme Court in the 1943 case of
Parker v. Brown.74
The policy underlying the state action exemption doctrine is the preservation of
the principles of federalism that would allow states to pass legislations, which albeit
with anticompetitive bent, are designed to protect the welfare of their respective
citizens.75 However, the state action exemption doctrine is not entirely unqualified,
and a brief review of the facts of Parker v. Brown is germane in order to fully grasp
the significance of the doctrine for the analysis of the possible antitrust barrier to a
general ban on the non-lawyer use of legal software.
In Parker, the California legislature approved a marketing programme for
agricultural commodities pursuant to the California Agricultural Prorate Act, which
generally restricted the way that raisins producers could market their crops.76
Specifically, the legislation placed a restriction on competition among raisins
growers, and controlled the prices at which raisins were sold to packers who
processed and sold the raisins on intestate markets.77 The main objectives of the Act
were to conserve California’s agricultural wealth and prevent economic waste in the
marketing of agricultural crops.78 The appellee, who was a producer and raisins
packer, challenged the legislation on grounds that it impinged on the antitrust
provisions of the Sherman Act.79
The US Supreme Court rejected the argument that the California legislation
contravened antitrust provisions of the Sherman Act, on grounds inter alia that the
anti-trust law applied only to persons and corporations, and not to States who, under
the Federal system, retained their legislative sovereignty, ‘‘…save only as Congress
may constitutionally subtract from their authority…’’80
However, states’ legislative sovereignty as espoused in Parker, was no carte
blanche for states to trammel the provisions of antitrust laws, as no state could
exempt anyone or corporation from, or authorise them to violate the provisions of
the Sherman Act.81 In this regards, the Parker Court did note that there was no
72 15 U.S.C. Sects. 1–7 (2004) as amended.
73 Ibid., sections 1–2.
74 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
75 Trujillo 2006, supra, note 75, at 352.
76 Parkers v. Brown, supra, note 76, at 345–346.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid., at 346.
79 Ibid., at 348–349.
80 Ibid., 350–351.
81 Ibid., at 314.
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evidence that the state of California or its municipality authorised any private
persons or businesses to restrain trade or competition in interstate raisins markets.82
Rather the Parker Court observed that:
[i]t is the state, acting through the Commission, which adopts the program and
which endorses it with penal sanctions, in the execution of a governmental
policy… The state itself exercises its legislative authority in making the
regulation and in prescribing the conditions of its application.83
A fortiori, a state could still be liable for anti-trust violations if there was
evidence that any of the provisions of a state’s laws authorised private persons or
corporations to enforce the laws or restrain interstate trade or competition. This is
exemplified by California Retail Liquor Association v. Midcal Aluminum,84 where
the US Supreme Court held that a California wine pricing statute violated the
Sherman Act, because the price setting and enforcement were to be established by
private parties rather than the state of California.85 The Supreme Court in Midcal
also noted that the arrangement was such that there was no sufficient ‘‘active
supervision by the state of California’’.86 The Court further observed that for a state
statute to be exempted from the Sherman Act, it must be ‘‘clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed as state policy,’’ while the policy must be ‘‘actively
supervised by the state itself.’’87
By extrapolation, and in the context of the Reynoso decision, unauthorised
practice of law legislations are without doubt, clearly articulated policies
purposefully designed by states authorities to protect citizens from unqualified
attorneys.88 The policies could also be said to be actively supervised by states
usually through ‘Unauthorised Practice of Law Committees’, established pursuant
to states’ laws and acting under the auspices of states’ Supreme Courts (Vida 2000–
2001). However, in the context of anti-trust regulation, this would not per se,
automatically preclude judicial oversight, especially by federal courts, of the
provisions of a state’s unauthorised practice of law statute. This proposition is
exemplified by Surety Title Insurance Agency v. Virginia State Bar,89 where certain
provisions of the then state of Virginia’s unauthorised practice of law legislation
were held violative of antitrust provisions of the Sherman Act.90
The plaintiff in Surety Title Insurance Agency had proposed to use lay employees
instead of attorneys to prepare the deeds relating to its insurance transactions due to
82 Ibid., 351–352.
83 Ibid., at 352.
84 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
85 Ibid., at 103.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid., at 150.
88 Fischer (2000–2001), supra, note 3, at 138–139; Ohio State Bar Association v. Newburn, supra, note 2,
at 97.
89 431 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. Va. 1977), vacated and remanded, 571 F.2d 205 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 941 (1978) (Hereinafter referred to as Surety Title Insurance Agency).
90 Ibid.
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the difficulty it faced in recruiting willing attorneys to do the job. However, the
advisory opinions of the Virginia Bar’s Unauthorised Practice Committee charac-
terised the plaintiff’s proposal as tantamount to unauthorised practice of law, and
threatened disciplinary actions against the plaintiff. The plaintiff challenged the
Virginia Bar’s stance on its recruitment policy as a restraint on trade and a
contravention of the antitrust provisions of the Federal Sherman Act.91
In reply, the Virginia Bar contended that its unauthorised practice procedures
were protected from anti-trust legal challenge by the state action exemption from
Federal antitrust laws as espoused by the U.S. Supreme Court in Parker v. Brown.92
In other words, that its laws forbidding the hiring of lay employees in the practice of
law were exempted from the Sherman Act and not open to a legal challenge. The
District Court rejected Virginia Bar’s defence on grounds inter alia that the process
of its advisory opinion barring plaintiff from using lay employees, was not
sufficiently related to legitimate state interest as to outweigh its anti-competitive
consequences under the Sherman Act.93
Arguably, a state’s legitimate interest would be one over which the state could
properly assert its legislative sovereignty as espoused by the Supreme Court in
Parker v. Brown.94 Thus, by extrapolation, any provision in a state’s unauthorised
practice of law legislation that outrightly95 prohibits non-lawyer general use of legal
software would have to be sufficiently related to the state’s legitimate interests or be
a proper subject over which the state could exercise its legislative sovereignty, in
order to pass the antitrust muster. However, I would argue that any general ban on
the use of legal software by non-lawyers (other than as circumscribed or qualified in
Reynoso96) would most certainly fail the state antitrust exemption tests as espoused
in Parker, California Retail Liquor Association, and Surety Title Insurance Agency
cases. This is because a general ban on non-lawyer use of legal software would
arguably be too overreaching as to derogate from states’ legitimate interest and
legislative sovereignty over the practice of law in their respective jurisdictions.97
This proposition is arguably further validated by the U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,98 where the Court held inter alia that the
Virginia State Bar statute, requiring County Bar minimum fees, was engaging in
91 Ibid.
92 Supra, note 76, at 341–368.
93 Surety Title Insurance Agency v. Virginia State Bar, supra, note 92 at 308.
94 Supra, note 76, at 341; Elizabeth Trujillo, supra, note 75, at 352.
95 The emphasis is mine and intended to make a distinction between a restrictive use of legal software as
demonstrated by Reynoso and a total non-conditional prohibition of the use of legal software by non-
lawyers.
96 In re: Jayson Reynoso, supra, note 21, at 1117.
97 In the United States, all States regulate the practice of law via States unauthorised practice of law
legislations and committees that operate under the auspices of States’ Supreme Courts. In the State of
Ohio for example, Sect. 2(B)(1)(g), Article IV, Ohio Constitution, confers on the Supreme Court of Ohio,
original jurisdiction over the ‘‘[a]dmission to the practice of law, the discipline of persons so admitted,
and all other matters relating to the practice of law.’’ See Ohio State Bar Association v. Newburn, supra,
note 2, at 97. For discussion, see Marie A. Vida, supra, note 91, 231 at 235.
98 421 U.S. 773, (1975).
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private conduct that was not necessarily immune from antitrust liability.99
Significantly, the Court in Goldfarb noted that ‘‘…the fact that the Bar is a state
agency for some limited purposes does not create an antitrust shield that allows it to
foster anti-competitive practices for the benefits of its members.’’100 Viewed from
this perspective, any States’ regulation on unauthorised practice of law, prohibiting
non-lawyers from using legal software or expert systems (other than as circum-
scribed in Reynoso) could impinge on the provisions of the Sherman Act, and could
well be challenged by the aggrieved party for violating same.
4.2 General ban on non-lawyer use of legal software could run afoul
of the constitutional commerce clause doctrine
A related obstacle to the states’ unauthorised practice of law legislations outrightly
prohibiting non-lawyers from using legal software or expert systems in law, is the
Constitutional Commerce Clause provisions of article 1, Sect. 8, Clause 3 of the
United States Constitution, which empowers Congress to regulate commerce and
trade nationally and internationally.101 In Healy v. The Beer Institute, the US
Supreme Court held that ‘‘This affirmative grant of authority to Congress also
encompasses an implicit or ‘dormant’ limitation on the authority of the states to
enact legislation affecting interstate commerce.’’102 The Supreme Court had earlier
expressed similar views in its decision in Parker v. Brown,103 when it noted that:
The governments of the states are sovereign within their territory save only as
they are subject to the prohibitions of the Constitution or as their action in
some measure conflicts with powers delegated to the National Government, or
with Congressional legislation enacted in the exercise of those powers…104
Thus, the supremacy of federal laws over states laws is integral to the smooth
workings of the US federalism, and the Commerce Clause is the basis for decades’
worth of jurisprudence that prohibits states from regulating in ways that could
hamper interstate commerce (Oriola 2005),105 even in the absence of Congressional
action.106 The principle has been applied in various commercial settings by the US
Supreme Court with varied outcomes (occasioned largely by the peculiar facts of
each case) that either prohibited the State legislation in question as unconstitutional,
or that absolved it of any contravention of the Commerce Clause.107 For example in
Parker v. Brown,108 the Court held that the California Agricultural Prorate Act,
99 Ibid., at 792.
100 Ibid., at 791.
101 Article 1, Sect. 8, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution.
102 491 U.S. 324, 326 n.1 (1989).
103 Supra, note 76, at 341.
104 Ibid, at 318.
105 Oriola (2005), 113–166, at 134–135.
106 CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 87 (1987).
107 Oriola 2005, supra, note 108, at 135.
108 Parker v. Brown, supra, note 76 at 341.
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which controlled the sale and purchase of raisins, prior to processing and packing
for interstate sale and shipment, did not place undue burden on interstate commerce,
and consequently did not contravene the Commerce Clause.109 The Parker Court
also noted that: ‘‘…the grant of power to Congress by the Commerce Clause did not
wholly withdraw from the states the authority to regulate the commerce with respect
to matters of local concern, on which Congress has not spoken.’’110
Therefore, the Commerce Clause could theoretically be invoked by any
aggrieved party, against a state law prohibiting non-lawyers from using legal
software or expert systems in law, if it could be proven that the said statute
interfered with interstate commerce or trade in, or sales of legal software, or that it
had encroached on the power of any of the sister states to legislate on the general or
commercial use of legal software by non-lawyers.111 It is sacrosanct that legal
software or expert systems in law is subject of commerce or property rights and
therefore trade-able. Moreover, as noted above, legal software or expert systems in
law configured for legal services delivery is inherently proprietary and could be
subject of intellectual property rights over which the Federal government through
Congress has exclusive legislative power (Adelman 1998).112 A fortiori, the
Constitutional Commerce Clause is a potential obstacle to a state’s unauthorised
practice of law statute, which outrightly prohibits the general use of legal software
by non-lawyers. Such a statute would be vulnerable to a legal challenge premised on
grounds that it could undermine Congressional legislations regulating property
rights in legal software, or disrupt interstate commerce or trade in legal software.
4.3 Pro se legal representation and legal software or expert systems in law
Yet another potential obstacle to a state’s unauthorised practice of law legislation
that outrightly prohibits the use of legal software by non-lawyers is the citizens’
constitutional rights to pro se legal representation. The right was re-affirmed by the
US Supreme Court in Anthony Faretta v. California, where the Court held that
criminal defendants had a constitutional right to refuse counsel and represent
themselves in courts.113 In fact, most States have constitutional, evidentiary, or
procedural rules guaranteeing citizens’ right to pro se legal representation in
109 Ibid., at 360–367.
110 Ibid., at 360.
111 For discussion, see generally Oriola 2005, supra, note 108, at 134–140.
112 Software programs are protectable by patents and copyright laws in the United States. See Adelman
(1998), at 105.
113 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807, (1975). Note however the qualification to the Faretta ruling
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993), where the Court held inter alia that
the constitutional right to self-representation in courts could be denied in a criminal case, if the accused
was perceived as incompetent or unfit to represent themselves. Also the right to Pro se legal
representation does not apply to appellate courts. See the Supreme Court decision in Martinez v.
California Court of Appeals, 528 U.S. 152, (2000).
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courts.114 The 2002 Federal Bankruptcy Code is a relevant example of a Federal law
that allows for pro se legal representation in Bankruptcy cases.115 Therefore, non-
lawyers could legally use bankruptcy legal software to prepare and file their own
bankruptcy petitions. In the same vein, any pro se litigants would be able to legally
use any relevant legal software in the prosecution of their civil or criminal cases in
courts. Therefore, any unauthorised practice of law statute that generally prohibits
non-lawyer uses of legal software could hinder pro se litigants’ access to legal
software and indirectly impinge on their constitutional right to self legal
representation in courts.
4.4 The constitutionality of prohibiting the programming, manufacturing,
distributing, and selling of legal software by unauthorised practice of law
statutes
Another potential obstacle is the constitutionality of prohibiting or restricting the
programming or manufacturing, selling or distributing of legal software by non-
lawyers, on grounds of possible violations of unauthorised practice of law statutes.
As noted earlier, the Court of Appeals in Reynoso held inter alia that the legal
software in question qualified as a bankruptcy petition preparer,116 because it
supplied legal citations and automatically determined where non-lawyers users
should place relevant information.117 This is due to the fact that by its very nature,
legal software is programmed to process the facts fed into it, and produce
appropriate legal instruments and instructions on how to use it, thus accomplishing
everything that a lawyer would typically do.118 It is thus arguable that legal
software, being intelligent systems, is ipso facto an embodied legal advice or a
device that could suo motu proffer legal advice.
The pertinent question therefore is whether non-lawyers who programme,
manufacture, design, distribute, or sell legal software could be said to be engaging
in unauthorised practice of law? In other words, would they be deemed to be
making, selling, or distributing legal advice? The answer would, to a large extent,
depend on the nature of the legal software and the tasks it was programmed to
accomplish. If for example, the legal software was programmed to prepare
bankruptcy petitions, pleadings, or wills, or any activities which courts are inclined
to regard as lawyers’ prerogative,119 then non-lawyer programmers who make,
114 See for example Article 1, Sect. 10 of the Constitution of the State of Alabama 1901, (as amended)
which provides: ‘‘That no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this
state by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.’’
115 Bankruptcy Code (2002) as amended, supra, note 55.
116 In re: Jayson Reynoso, supra, note 21, at 1123.
117 Ibid., at 1125.
118 For discussion see, Vincenti 1988, at 205.
119 Due to the fact that wills do create legal rights upon which courts may be called upon to interpret, and
that wills making require a certain degree of confidentiality which legal attorneys are obliged to provide,
courts often regard wills making as the exclusive preserve of lawyers. For discussion, see Palmer v.
Unauthorized Practice Committee of the State of Texas, 438 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969), at 377.
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distribute or sell the software could be liable for selling or giving of legal advice and
vulnerable to unauthorised practice of law charges.
While the Reynoso court refrained from pronouncing on this issue, such a
conclusion could be reasonably inferred from the decision. This is especially so
because, a la Reynoso,120 giving of legal advice is the boundary beyond which non-
lawyers handling legal software or legal expert systems in law must not venture.
Therefore if the Reynoso software was tantamount to legal advice or the giving of legal
advice as the court of Appeals ruled,121 then by extrapolation, whoever makes, sells, or
distribute legal software could potentially be liable for unauthorised practice of law.
This hypothesis is clearly supported by the decision of the United States District
Court of the Northern District of Texas in Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee
v. Parsons Technology, Inc.122 Parsons Technology Inc., were the manufacturer of a
will-creating software program known as ‘‘Quicken Family Lawyer’’ (QFL) version
8.0, which was updated in 1999. QFL software offered over one hundred legal forms
bundled with instructions on how to complete them.123 The Texas Unauthorized
Practice of Law Committee filed a lawsuit challenging the sale of QFL as a
contravention of the then Sect. 81.101 of Texas’ Unauthorized Practice of Law
Statute, which provided as follows:
(a) In this chapter the ‘‘practice of law’’ means the preparation of a pleading or
other document incident to an action or special proceeding or the management
of the action or proceeding on behalf of a client before a judge in court as well
as a service rendered out of court, including the giving of advice or the
rendering of any service requiring the use of legal skill or knowledge, such as
preparing a will, contract, or other instrument, the legal effect of which under
the facts and conclusions involved must be carefully determined.
(b) The definition in this section is not exclusive and does not deprive the judicial
branch of the power and authority under both this chapter and the adjudicated
cases to determine whether other services and acts not enumerated may
constitute the practice of law.124
The District Court ruled in favour of Texas Unauthorised Practice of Law
Committee, by permanently injuncting Parsons Technology Inc from selling and
distributing QFL software, on grounds that their actions amounted to unauthorised
practice of law.125 Parsons Technology Inc appealed the injunction, and while the
appeal was pending, Texas legislature amended Sect. 81.101(a) of the Unauthorised
Practice of Law statute to exclude inter alia, the design, creation, publication,
distribution, display, or sale of computer software provided the products conspic-
uously state that they were not a substitute for legal advice. The full terms of the
amendment is best captured in the words of the statute which provides thus:
120 In re: Jayson Reynoso, supra, note 21, at 1123.
121 Ibid, at 1125.
122 Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee v. Parsons Technology, Inc 1999 WL 47235.
123 Ibid.
124 Tex. Govt. Code Ann. Section 81.101 (West 1998) (amended in 1999).
125 Supra, note 125.
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In this chapter, the ‘‘practice of law’’ does not include the design, creation,
publication, distribution, display, or sale by means of an internet web site, of
written materials, books, forms, computer software, or similar products if the
products clearly and conspicuously state that the products are not a substitute
for the advice of legal attorney…126
Thus, the amendment effectively reversed the District Court’s injunction, and the
Court of Appeals had little choice but to subsequently vacate the injunction against
Parsons Technology Inc.127 It is instructive to note that Texas is the only one out of
fifty other states that makes conditional exception for designing or making of legal
computer software in its unauthorised practice of law legislation. Thus in other
states, the design, creation, publication, or distribution of legal computer software
could still be held violative of their unauthorised practice of legislations. This
divergent approaches further underscores the imperatives of a uniform and coherent
definitional constructs of unauthorised practice of law across the United States.
Thus if other states fail to emulate the amendment to Texas’ unauthorised
practice of law statute, their laws could be vulnerable to the First Amendment free
speech challenge, if confronted with facts similar to Parsons Technology Inc case.
Without doubt, legal software or expert systems in law is a critical tool for
communicating legal information, and any attempt to suppress its design,
manufacture, distribution, or sale, could potentially impinge on the First Amend-
ment right to free speech,128 which according to Gerald Treece, ‘‘…absolutely
stands for the free flow of information’’ (Treece 1999).129
An analogous but apt example was the 1967 case of New York County Lawyers
Association v. Dacey, where the New York Court of Appeals held inter alia that the
state’s attempt to prohibit the sale of a popular probate book written by Norman
Dacey, (a non-attorney with 35 years experience in estate management) and entitled
‘‘How to Avoid Probate’’, contravened the First Amendment right to freedom of
expression.130 The Court had noted that while lawyers were uncomfortable that the
book had encroached on their rights, it was no justification for banning the book.131
In the Court’s words:
It is a prized American privilege to speak one’s mind, although not always
with perfect good taste, on all public institutions… Free and open discussion
or even controversy could lead to reforms, if needed, or improvement where
desirable. Books purporting to give advice on the law and books critical of law
126 Tex. Govt. Code Ann. Section 81.101 (Supp. 2000).
127 Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee v. Parsons Technology Inc., 179 F.3d 956 (5th Cir. 1999).
128 The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that: ‘‘Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.’’ For discussion, see Fischer (2000–2001), supra, note 3, at
136–137.
129 Treece (1999), 971, at 972.
130 283 N.Y.S. 2d 984, 996 (N.Y. App. Div. 1967), revised on the dissenting opinion, 234 in N.E. 2d 459
(N.Y. 1967).
131 Ibid., at 1000-01.
T. A. Oriola
123
and legal institutions have been and doubtless will continue to be published.
Legal forms are available for purchase at many legal stationery stores. Unless
we are to extend a rule of suppression beyond the obscene, the libelous,
utterances of or tending to incitement, and matters simply characterized, there
is no warrant for the action here taken.132
Significantly, the Court went ahead to qualify Dacey’s free speech right to
publish his book, by subordinating it to societal overall interests. In the Court’s
words: ‘‘if the exercise of Dacey’s right to freedom of speech by this publication
violates reasonable standards erected for the protection of society, or of important
interests of society, his right could be subordinated for the common good and the
protection of the whole.’’133 However, this qualification is not without precedent for
there are no absolute civil rights as such. For example a person’s freedom of
movement could be legally constrained by a lawful imprisonment meted out for a
crime committed against the State.
Moreover, and significantly, the First Amendment not only protects free speech,
but also guarantees access to it, and legal advice, whether embodied in software or a
book is inherently informational, and access to it would be guaranteed by the First
Amendment. This proposition is supported by the US Supreme Court in Board of
Trustees State University of New York v. Fox.134 The university had banned certain
persons who were engaged in for-profit activities from university dormitories.135
The ban was challenged by the Respondents, and the Supreme Court set it aside on
grounds inter alia that the ban would prevent students from receiving legal advice in
their rooms, and that legal advice was a constitutionally protected speech.136
Viewed from the foregoing analyses, the First Amendment is a potential obstacle to
any unauthorised practice of law legislation that bans non-lawyers from making,
designing, distributing, and selling legal software.
5 Statutory and judicial constructs of unauthorised practice of law legislations:
a conundrum
If anything, the Parsons Technology case demonstrates the inherent ambiguity in the
statutory conception and judicial constructs of the meaning of ‘unauthorised
practice of law’ in the United States. This ambiguity makes it all the more difficult
for coherent judicial analyses of when the use of legal software by non-lawyers
would infringe unauthorised practice of law legislations. Although the Texas
legislative amendment infused the debate with relative certainty, and brought
immediate closure to the Parsons Technology case, non-lawyers making, selling,
distributing, or using legal software are arguably vulnerable to unauthorised practice
132 Ibid.
133 Ibid., at 1000.
134 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
135 Ibid., 471–472.
136 Ibid., at 482.
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of law charges in other states without the Texas-type conditional statutory
exemption.
Without doubt, the definition of what constitutes the practice of law in the United
States has almost always exuded legal and political connotations (Rose 2002),137
while its juridical and statutory constructs often vary from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction (Lanctot 2002).138 For example, earlier attempts by the American Bar
Association at regulating unauthorised legal practice via a regime of ‘‘Statement of
Principles’’ were stiffly resisted (Denckla 1999, note 19), and held violative of
antitrust regulations by the US Supreme Court (Podgers 1980).139
The main bane of regulating unauthorised practice of law activities lays in the
difficulty of conceptualising the exact parameters of what constitute the practice of
law.140 Due to inherent statutory ambiguity, Judges in the United States have been
equally flummoxed and unable to nail down the exact meaning of what the practice
of law is, and have tended to take ‘‘an ad hoc approach’’ to deconstructing the
term.141 For example, in the Reynoso case142 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit acknowledged the intractability of the term, which California
courts have accepted as including ‘‘…legal advice and counsel and the preparation
of legal instruments and contracts.’’143 The Court of Appeals then drew on the
earlier California case of Baron v. Los Angeles,144 where the court opined that
‘‘ascertaining whether a particular activity falls within this general definition may be
a formidable endeavor.’’145
However, the proliferation of online non-lawyer legal documents providers as
typified by Reynoso makes a clearer and definitive conception of the practice of law
imperative and urgent. Computerised web-based legal programs offering legal
services are a putative force, with relatively greater capabilities to encroach on the
turfs of authorised legal practitioners, than previously possible via books,146 due to
internet ubiquity and the relative ease of content dissemination and access. For
instance, a definitive statutory conception of the practice of law, in the context of the
sale and distribution of legal software by non-lawyers, as exemplified by Texas
legislative amendment, is imperative for clearer judicial interpretation.
The ABA’s Centre for Professional Responsibility, through its Task Force,
proposed a model definition for the practice of law in September 2002.147
According to the preliminary draft, the practice of law is defined as ‘‘…the
137 Rose (2002), at 585.
138 See Lanctot (2002), supra note 2 at 811–812.
139 For discussion, see Podgers 1980.
140 See Lanctot 2002, supra note 2 at 820–821.
141 Ibid., at 812.
142 In re: Jayson Reynoso, supra, note 21, at 1125.
143 Ibid.
144 Supra, note 58, at 353.
145 In re: Jayson Reynoso, supra, note 21, at 1125.
146 See for example, New York County Lawyers’ Association. v. Dacey, supra, note 133 at 996.
147 See Centre for Professional Responsibility, ABA, Task Force on the Model Definition of the Practice
of Law, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/model_def_home.html (last accessed on 2 August 2010).
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application of legal principles and judgment with regard to the circumstances or
objectives of a person that require the knowledge and skill of a person trained in the
law.’’148 The preliminary definition of the ‘Practice of Law’ then listed the
circumstances under which a person would be presumed to be practising law.149
These include giving advice or counsel to persons on their legal rights and
responsibilities or to those of others,150 selecting, drafting, or completing legal
documents or agreements that affect the legal rights of others,151 representing a
person before an adjudicative body, including but not limited to documents
preparation, or filing, or conducting discovery,152 or negotiating legal rights or
responsibilities on behalf of a person.153 Anyone engaging in unauthorised practice
of law shall be subject to criminal and civil penalties.154 This recommendation was
adopted by the American Bar Association on August 11, 2003.155 The ABA has
recommended that every state and territory adopt a definition of the ‘Practice of
Law’ that reflects the one in the model definition.156
However, the ABA model definition did not address the place of legal software as
Texas definition did by conditionally exempting the sale or distribution of legal
software from the statutory scope of unauthorised practice of law. For sure, legal
software will continually evolve and increase in sophistication, and there is little the
legal profession could do to stifle its sale and use by non-lawyers. Any attempts at
stifling the manufacture and use of legal software could most certainly raise legal
roadblocks ranging from antitrust, First Amendment right to free speech, pro se
legal representation, to constitutional commerce clause barriers as analysed in this
paper.
Significantly, apart from potential legal and constitutional pitfalls, a sustained
opposition to the general use of legal software could potentially undermine the
advancement of legal information technological tools and information science. In
my view, the Texas unauthorised practice of law legislation as amended is a very
good model that could obviate potential legal squabbles with regards to the sale or
distribution of legal software. Adopting the Texas model by other states would help
guide the courts in cases similar to Reynoso, in delineating the parameters within
which non-lawyers could use legal software. It is suggested that a uniform statutory
definition of the practice of law akin to that of Texas be adopted by states across the
United States. Significantly, non-lawyers using legal software other than pro se
148 Ibid.
149 Ibid.
150 Ibid.
151 Ibid.
152 Ibid.
153 Ibid.
154 Ibid.
155 See American Bar Association, Task Force on the Model Definition of the Practice of Law, Standing
Committee On Client Protection, Washington State Bar Association, Report To The House Of Delegates,
Recommendation, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/model-def/recomm.pdf (last accessed on 2 August 2010).
156 Ibid.
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litigants should refrain from representing themselves as legal experts or proffer legal
advice as exemplified by Reynoso case.
6 Conclusion
This paper critically analyses the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit in Reynoso case. The appellants, who were non-lawyers, were
indicted with unauthorised practice of law for offering bankruptcy petition services
via expert systems in law configured for filing bankruptcy petition forms. The Court
of Appeals found inter alia that appellants were bankruptcy petition preparers, and
that they had exceeded their clerical remit by offering legal advice and legal
services in contravention of California law regulating legal practice and 11 U.S.C.
Sect. 110 of the Bankruptcy Code (2002). While examining the legal ramifications
of the use of legal software or expert systems in law by non-lawyers, the paper
critically reviews the factual circumstances of Reynoso decision in the context of
juridical and statutory constructs of unauthorised practice of law in the United
States. The paper posits that the Reynoso decision should be viewed as a one off
decision bound by its peculiar facts, and not good law for the broad proposition that
non-lawyers cannot use expert systems in law.
The paper however notes the narrow confines set by Reynoso, within which non-
lawyers could use legal software. However, while Reynoso provides judicial
guidance on how non-lawyers could use legal software, (with the exception of the
state of Texas) there is no nation-wide statutory guidance on whether the sale or
distribution of legal software would constitute unauthorised practice of law. The
paper also notes that any efforts to undermine the general use of legal software by
non-lawyers could raise constitutional and legal obstacles ranging from antitrust
provisions of the Sherman Act, the right to pro se legal representation, constitutional
commerce clause doctrine, to the First Amendment right to free speech. It is
suggested that every state adopts the model definition of the practice of law that is
akin to that of the state of Texas, which clearly exempts the sale of legal software
from unauthorised practice of law, provided this is coupled with express and
conspicuous disclaimer that the software is no substitute for legal advice. This
would provide a statutory definitional certainty, in the same way that Reynoso case,
to some extent, provides judicial certainty on the scope of non-lawyer use of legal
software in the United States.
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